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ROUNDTABLE: THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
Drones and the International
Rule of Law
Rosa Brooks
The international rule of law hinges on the existence of a shared lexiconaccepted by states and other actors in the international system. Withno independent judicial system capable of determining (and enforcing)
the meaning of words and concepts, states must develop shared interpretations
of the law and the concepts and terms it relies on, and be willing (mostly) to
abide by those shared interpretations. When such shared interpretations exist,
key aspects of the rule of law can be present even in the absence of an inter-
national judicial system; state behavior can be reasonably predictable, nonarbi-
trary, and transparent; and accountability can also be possible, albeit mainly
through nonjudicial mechanisms.
U.S. drone strikes represent a signiﬁcant challenge to the international rule of
law. This is not because recent U.S. drone strikes “violate” international law; iro-
nically, they might be less destabilizing, from a rule-of-law perspective, if they
could be easily categorized as blatant instances of rule-breaking. Rather, U.S.
drone strikes challenge the international rule of law precisely because they defy
straightforward legal categorization. In fact, drone strikes—or, more accurately,
the post-/ legal theories underlying such strikes—constitute a serious, sus-
tained, and visible assault on the generally accepted meaning of certain core
legal concepts, including “self-defense,” “armed attack,” “imminence,” “necessity,”
“proportionality,” “combatant,” “civilian,” “armed conﬂict,” and “hostilities.”
At its most fundamental level, the rule of law is concerned with constraining
and ordering power and violence. Within the international system, this concern
has led states to develop detailed legal rules governing the use of armed force.
Like all law, the laws of war have always been somewhat vague and ambiguous;
and, to a degree, this can be seen as a virtue rather than a vice in a system that
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lacks a judiciary and a reliable enforcement mechanism. Up to a point, legal
vagueness and ambiguity give states face-saving ways to avoid conﬂict, enabling
them to “look the other way” if a particular state occasionally engages in challeng-
ing but not manifestly illegal behavior. Vagueness and ambiguity can also some-
times offer an efﬁcient way for consensus-based changes in the law. For instance,
amending the language of international treaties might be cumbersome or im-
possible, but some degree of vagueness and ambiguity in treaty language can
permit shared interpretations to be modiﬁed over time, thus providing the com-
munity of states with a relatively simple “backdoor” means of changing the effect
of a treaty.
Beyond a certain point, however, vagueness and ambiguity are crippling. When
key international law concepts lose any ﬁxed meaning, consensus breaks down
about how to evaluate state behavior; and although legal rules may continue to
exist on paper, they no longer ensure that states will behave in a predictable, non-
arbitrary fashion. Moreover, even when there is substantial international consen-
sus on the meaning of key concepts, the rule of law can be undermined—as in the
case of U.S. drone strikes—if the sole superpower consistently challenges the com-
monly accepted meaning of concepts vital to the regulation of violence.
When one or more powerful states challenge the generally accepted meaning of
core legal concepts, other states face a choice. They can accept the “new” interpre-
tations, in which case (if a sufﬁcient number of states will go along with it) inter-
national law will quietly change. Alternatively, they can take the opposite tack,
directly confronting those states seeking to reinterpret the law and demanding
ﬁdelity to previously shared interpretations. This route is risky: if it succeeds,
legal stability is restored, but if it fails, legal disputes can escalate into open con-
ﬂict. Finally, states dismayed by new interpretations of once-ﬁxed legal concepts
can take a middle ground, quietly questioning new interpretations of the law
while reafﬁrming their own interpretations. This route reduces the likelihood of
conﬂict, but by enabling disparate legal interpretations to coexist without any
obvious means of reconciling them, it can also prolong or increase legal uncer-
tainty. For the most part, the international community has so far taken this middle
path in response to U.S. drone strikes. It remains to be seen whether this path will
ultimately lead to a reemergence of international consensus or whether it will per-
manently undermine the international rule of law.
This essay will proceed in four parts. First, it will brieﬂy discuss the concept of
the international rule of law. Second, it will offer a short factual background on
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U.S. drone strikes (to the extent that it is possible to provide factual background
on a practice so shrouded in secrecy). Third, it will highlight some of the key ways
in which post-/ U.S. legal theories relating to the use of force challenge pre-
viously accepted concepts and seek to redeﬁne previously well-understood
terms. Fourth, it will offer brief concluding thoughts on the future of the inter-
national rule of law in light of this challenge.
The International Rule of Law
The “rule of law” is a concept capacious enough to mean different things to differ-
ent people. As a result, surface consensus on the value of the rule of law often
masks substantial disagreement about critical details. Scholars debate the question
of whether the rule of law should be understood in purely formal terms or in sub-
stantive terms, whether it should be viewed as a “thick” or “thin” concept, and
whether it is best understood as an end unto itself or merely as a means toward
some other end, such as democracy or the realization of human rights. In
, UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan described the rule of law on the domestic
level as:
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and pri-
vate, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with inter-
national human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal
transparency.
This conception of the rule of law translates only imperfectly onto the inter-
national domain. In the most basic sense, the notion of international rule of
law implies that states (and other international actors, such as the United
Nations itself) should be bound by international law. Beyond this, international
rule of law also implies a range of principles and requirements to ensure that
the laws are in fact binding and that there is a sense of institutional and procedural
fairness. Precisely what this requires is the subject of much debate. At the national
level, it is generally taken for granted that a robust rule-of-law society must have a
strong, independent judiciary. To state the obvious, this does not (yet) exist at the
drones and the international rule of law 85
international level, despite the proliferation of international and regional adjudi-
cative bodies of varying sorts.
However, the lack of such an international judicial system does not inevitably
render state behavior arbitrary and unpredictable. As Louis Henkin famously
reminded us, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” This suggests
that the lack of a strong, independent global judicial system is not necessarily
fatal to the realization of the rule of law, insofar as state compliance can often
be obtained through other means. These include internal and external reputa-
tional pressures, diplomacy, arbitration, concerns about reciprocity and retalia-
tion, ad hoc tribunals, and a range of other dispute-resolution and compliance
mechanisms.
Another difﬁculty relates to how best to translate the concept of “equality before
the law” onto the international level. In a strictly formal sense, equality before the
law seems to require equality between sovereign states. This, indeed, is how the
UN General Assembly appears to interpret the concept of international rule of
law. In a September  resolution (adopted without a vote), the General
Assembly declared:
We recognize that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to international
organizations, including the United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect
for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all of their activities and
accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions. We also recognize that all persons,
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to
just, fair and equitable laws and are entitled without any discrimination to equal pro-
tection of the law. . . . We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sover-
eign equality of all States.
This sits somewhat uneasily with the Secretary-General’s insistence that the rule of
law requires consistency “with international human rights norms and standards.”
If we ground our conception of the rule of law in human rights, it is not clear that
there is anything normatively compelling about the equality of sovereign states;
after all, some states are democratic, while others are repressive; some are wealthy
and strong, while others are poor and weak; some have tiny populations, while
others are vast. Why should states, which are artiﬁcial constructs marked by glar-
ing and often arbitrary differences, be treated equally? But most international law
is itself premised on sovereign equality; so for the time being, it is difﬁcult to see
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how to foster or sustain the international rule of law while jettisoning the principle
of sovereign equality.
Of course, as many have pointed out, the UN Charter itself is in this sense difﬁ-
cult to square with rule of law principles. In its creation of the Security Council,
the Charter permanently privileges some states over others for reasons that, with
the passage of time, seem increasingly arbitrary. If states are formal equals, why,
some seven decades after the end of the Second World War, should China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States be the only states with veto
power over Security Council resolutions?
A ﬁnal problem relates to the lack of mechanisms for ensuring access to law by
individuals. The international system is a creation of states, but as human rights
norms have been universalized, states have accepted a range of international
legal obligations toward individual human beings. At the moment, however,
there are still few means for individuals to vindicate their rights within the inter-
national system if they cannot get satisfaction through their own state.
It is not the purpose of this essay to examine competing conceptions of the
international rule of law or to exhaustively detail the existing rule-of-law problems
inherent in the current international system. For present purposes, it is probably
sufﬁcient to say that whatever else it may entail, the international rule of law
requires, at a bare minimum, the “avoidance of arbitrariness” and “procedural
and legal transparency.” Put differently, it requires that international law be, in
Simon Chesterman’s words, “prospective, accessible, and clear.” This is essential
for ensuring basic stability: states—and individuals, who act on behalf of states and
are acted upon by states—must be able to understand what is expected of them by
international law. If it is to have any value at all, international law must provide a
reasonably clear basis for predicting state behavior and for holding states to
account when their actions do not conform to legal requirements.
This is a fairly formalistic and thin conception of the international rule of law.
Nevertheless, even this weak version is undermined when key international law
concepts lose any ﬁxed meaning. When an exceptionally powerful state begins
to interpret international law in a substantially different way than most other
states, it becomes increasingly difﬁcult to predict that state’s behavior. And unpre-
dictability can spread: one powerful outlier can pave the way for others, and as
more states join the outlier, the foundations of the rule of law begin to crumble.
A state need not clearly “break” the law for the international rule of law to be
challenged or (potentially) undermined. As noted above, occasional incidents of
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straightforward and blatant rule-breaking may be less threatening than more
subtle but continuous challenges to the nature and meaning of international
law. This is because blatant rule-breaking is both relatively rare and relatively
easy to identify; it is also relatively easy to remedy through traditional dispute res-
olution mechanisms. To some extent, occasional blatant rule-breaking can even
shore up the international rule of law, by inspiring other states to reafﬁrm their
shared understanding of law’s meaning and by enabling the system to demonstrate
its corrective capacities. By so doing, states reinforce the legitimacy, strength, and
even-handedness of the law and legal institutions.
Consider an analogy to the domestic context. The rule of law does not require
that there be no rule-breakers; it merely requires that rule-breaking be relatively
rare and that most instances of rule-breaking be identiﬁed and punished. A robust
rule-of-law society has laws prohibiting homicide, for instance. If homicides
sometimes occur, this does not in itself threaten the rule of law, as long as such
homicides are not excessively widespread, are investigated in an evenhanded
fashion, and efforts to investigate and punish them are generally successful.
But if the concept of “homicide” loses all clarity—if a signiﬁcant number of
states or courts redeﬁne it by, for instance, adopting extremely permissive and
expansive deﬁnitions of self-defense—laws against homicide may cease to operate
predictably.
When it comes to the rule of law, the introduction of excessive and ongoing uncer-
tainty is thus far more threatening than occasional blatant rule-breaking. Some
vagueness and ambiguity is inevitable and even desirable in an international society
that lacks a judicial system, but the introduction of excessive uncertainty wholly
undermines the possibility of clarity, stability, predictability, and nonarbitrariness.
U.S. Drone Strikes: Known Unknowns
U.S. drone strikes have grown increasingly controversial in the last few years. This
is not because there is anything inherently sinister about drones as such; armed
drones merely represent the latest in a long line of technological developments
designed to enable the delivery of force from a distance. (In their time, the cross-
bow and the cannon were also condemned as devilish and dishonorable inven-
tions). For political decision-makers, unmanned aerial vehicles have obvious
advantages: they are cheaper to produce than manned aircraft with comparable
payloads; their use creates no short-term risk to American lives; and, relative to
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other weapons-delivery systems, their enhanced surveillance capabilities reduce
the likelihood of killing anyone other than the intended target.
As it happens, drone technologies improved dramatically just as the United
States, struggling to respond to the threat of transnational terrorism after /,
began to perceive an increased need for low-cost, low-risk cross-border uses of
force. Terrorist threats can come from anywhere, but it is impractical to use con-
ventional military force everywhere. (The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were a
powerful reminder of this fact.) In certain situations, drone strikes appear to
offer a cheaper, easier, and safer means of ﬁghting terrorists.
The ﬁrst U.S. drone strike is believed to have occurred in , when a Hellﬁre
missile launched by a Predator drone killed four suspected al-Qaeda members in
Yemen. Drone strikes remained a rarity until , however, when the Bush
administration launched thirty-six strikes in Pakistan. Beginning in , the
United States began to make more frequent use of strikes from unmanned aerial
vehicles. Most controversially, the United States has greatly increased its reliance
on drone strikes outside of traditional, territorially-bounded battlegrounds. In
Pakistan, the number of suspected strikes rose from four in  to a peak of
 in , before declining to forty-eight strikes in . In Yemen, suspected
drone strikes rose from three or four in  to an unknown peak in . (There
appears to have been at least twenty-six strikes in Yemen in , and possibly as
many as eighty-seven.) The United States has also carried out a smaller number
of strikes in Somalia, and there are unconﬁrmed rumors of U.S. drone strikes in
Mali and the Philippines as well. All told, U.S. drone strikes have killed an esti-
mated , people in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The percentage of civilian
deaths is unknown, and existing estimates are controversial.
Almost everything about U.S. drone strikes is shrouded in secrecy. For the most
part, the U.S. government does not comment on or acknowledge reported drone
strikes that take place outside of “hot” battleﬁelds, and it does not release lists of
those targeted or killed. Senior Obama administration ofﬁcials have offered ob-
lique accounts of the drone strike program, but these have been at an extremely
high level of generality, with few factual details or details relating to the adminis-
tration’s legal analysis. Even President Obama’s speech on drones, delivered at the
National Defense University on May , , did not serve to shed much light on
the subject. As a result, it is impossible to describe current U.S. practices or
internal procedures with any certainty, and also impossible to know exactly
what legal constraints U.S. ofﬁcials believe to exist, and whether and how these
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have changed in the last few years. We do know, however, that as a matter of inter-
national law the United States believes itself to be in an armed conﬂict with
“al-Qaeda and its associated forces.” We know the United States therefore con-
siders “al-Qaeda operatives” to be targetable as “combatants,” but we do not know
precisely how it identiﬁes or deﬁnes al-Qaeda operatives, agents, or members, or
how it deﬁnes the term “combatants” and applies it in the murky context of trans-
national terrorism. We also do not know precisely how the United States under-
stands the term “civilian” in the context of terrorism, or the concept of “direct
participation in hostilities.” Finally, we do not know how the United States
deﬁnes or identiﬁes “associates” or “co-belligerents” of al-Qaeda.
For example, President Obama’s speech on drone warfare—which one might
think would contain the most cogent explanation of America’s position on the
law of drone warfare—only offered the following nugget in support of its legality:
America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on /. Within a week, Congress over-
whelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the
United States is at war with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at
war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if
we did not stop them ﬁrst. So this is a just war—a war waged proportionally, in last
resort, and in self-defense.
Understanding U.S. legal arguments is made more difﬁcult by the fact that admin-
istration spokespersons often appear to oscillate between putting forward a law of
armed conﬂict framework and a self-defense framework when justifying drone
strikes. At times, U.S. ofﬁcials appear to have suggested that the self-defense fra-
mework supplements the armed conﬂict framework. In recent months, however,
their language has suggested that the United States has shifted entirely from an
armed conﬂict framework to a self-defense framework. In any case, a self-
defense framework possesses as many unknowns as an armed conﬂict framework:
we do not entirely know how the United States understands the terms “armed
attack” or “imminent” (though leaked memos offer some disturbing hints), nor
do we know how the United States evaluates issues of necessity and proportionality.
With regard to sovereignty issues, U.S. ofﬁcials have repeatedly stated that they
only use force inside the borders of a sovereign state when that state either con-
sents to the use of force or is “unwilling and unable” to take appropriate action to
address the threat itself. We do not know, however, how the United States evalu-
ates issues of consent in situations in which consent is ambiguous (such as in the
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case of Pakistan, in which the executive branch reportedly gave tacit consent to
drone strikes but publicly denied it, and in which the legislative and judicial
branches have denied consent). We also do not know precisely what criteria the
United States uses to determine whether a state is “unwilling or unable” to take
appropriate action.
U.S. Drone Strikes and the International Rule of Law:
Core Concepts Lose Their Meaning
That is a lot of unknowns. Nevertheless, if we piece together public statements by
U.S. ofﬁcials, leaked government documents, and the existing evidence about past
strikes and their targets, the basic outlines of the United States’ legal theory under-
lying targeted killings become visible. While much remains uncertain, it is clear
that recent statements and practices by the United States represent a substantial
challenge to international legal rules on the use of armed force with regard to
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules.
Let us start with jus ad bellum rules, the rules concerning when force may be
initiated. Under the UN Charter, states agree to “settle their international disputes
in a peaceful manner” and “refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.” This is generally viewed as a blanket prohibition on the use of force by
one state inside the borders of another sovereign state. Chapter VII of the UN
Charter outlines just two exceptions to this prohibition. First, if the Security
Council identiﬁes “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion,” it may “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.” For practical purposes,
this means that the Security Council can pass a resolution authorizing one or
more member states to use force to carry out its mandates. The second exception
relates to self-defense. In Article  the Charter says, “Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.”
It is difﬁcult to evaluate U.S. drone strikes under these rules. Clearly, the
Security Council has not expressly authorized the use of force by the United
States in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia. The Council has, however, expressly
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recognized that terrorist attacks can trigger a right to use force in self-defense, and
the Council implicitly gave its approval to the November  U.S. military inter-
vention in Afghanistan. In Security Council Resolution , passed one day after
the terrorist attacks of /, the Council stated that “such acts, like any act of
international terrorism,” constitute “a threat to international peace and secur-
ity.” In the same resolution, the Council also reafﬁrmed “the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”
This resolution and those that followed were viewed by the United States (and
by the international community generally) as sufﬁcient to permit the lawful use of
force in Afghanistan by the United States and NATO. Most commentators agreed
that the initial U.S./NATO campaign constituted a clear case of individual and
collective self-defense after the / attacks. On December , , the
Security Council authorized the creation of the International Security Assistance
Force for Afghanistan (ISAF), thus bringing the war in Afghanistan under the
formal umbrella of Security Council–authorized uses of force. In fact, from a
rule-of-law perspective, the process leading to military action in Afghanistan
was exemplary: the Security Council noted that an armed attack had occurred
and that states had the right to use force in self-defense. The United States and
NATO states then took action on their own “until the Security Council [took
the] measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” by author-
izing an international force.
Subsequent uses of force by the United States for counterterrorism purposes
outside Afghanistan pose a more complicated question. Security Council
Resolution  acknowledges that any act of international terrorism gives rise
to a right to self-defense and calls upon UN member states to “work together
to prevent and suppress terrorist acts” and “take the necessary steps to prevent
the commission of terrorist acts.” The United States appears to regard such gen-
eric statements as sufﬁcient international legal basis for discrete, ongoing uses of
force against suspected terrorists around the globe. This view is not wholly
implausible: if all terrorist acts threaten international peace and security and
give rise to a right to self-defense, and if the Security Council has tasked states
with taking “necessary steps” to prevent future terrorist acts, this seems like a
reasonable basis for concluding, at a minimum, that there is nothing manifestly
unlawful about U.S. drone strikes against terrorists (assuming drone strikes can
plausibly be viewed as “necessary”).
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From a broader rule-of-law perspective, however, this interpretation presents
several difﬁculties. For one thing, it seems to be an open-ended invitation for
states to engage in the unilateral use of force against suspected terrorists. But if
it is open-ended, it renders meaningless the UN Charter’s proviso that the right
to use force in self-defense lasts “until the Security Council has taken [the]
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” This is an
important implied limitation on the right to use force: the Charter language
clearly anticipates that the unilateral use of force in self-defense will be temporary
in nature, undertaken as an emergency measure only. Once the emergency is over,
the Charter appears to assume either that peace will have been restored or that the
state under attack will have dispelled the imminent threat and be in a position to
request that the Council take any measures needed to ensure its longer-term
safety.
Regardless of whether the Council takes action to address a threat, a state’s right
to respond to an armed attack is clearly subject to some temporal limitations; it
does not last indeﬁnitely. Thus, more than seventy years after the Pearl
Harbor attacks, the United States no longer has a legal basis for using force in self-
defense against Japan; similarly, from an international law perspective, it is doubt-
ful that the / attacks alone give rise to an indeﬁnitely continuing right to use
force in self-defense. This view is consistent with the traditional understanding of
the right to self-defense in international law, which limits the unilateral use of
force to situations in which a state is responding to a recent “armed attack” or
to an “imminent” threat of future attack. And at least on a superﬁcial level, the
United States appears to accept this view: “We act against terrorists who pose a
continuing and imminent threat to the American people,” President Obama
asserted in a May  speech.
This does not help us determine the legality of U.S. drone strikes, however,
because it merely shifts the question to how we deﬁne “imminent threat.” And
here, what we know of U.S. reasoning is not reassuring. Traditionally, there has
been substantial consensus among states and international law experts that an
imminent threat is one that is concrete and immediate, rather than speculative
or remote. But according to a leaked  Justice Department White Paper—
the most detailed legal justiﬁcation that is publicly available—the United States
is now taking a radically different approach to deﬁning imminence.
According to the White Paper, the requirement that force only be used to prevent
an “imminent” threat “does not require the United States to have clear evidence
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that a speciﬁc attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate
future.” This seems—and is—at odds with the traditional view. The White Paper
goes on to assert that “certain members of al-Qa’ida are continually plotting
attacks . . . [and] would engage in such attacks regularly [if they] were able to
do so, [and] the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qa’ida plots as
they are developing and thus cannot be conﬁdent that none is about to occur.”
As a result, the White Paper concludes that any person deemed to be an oper-
ational leader of al-Qaeda or its “associated forces” inherently presents an immi-
nent threat at all times—and as a result, the United States can lawfully target such
persons at all times, even in the absence of speciﬁc knowledge relating to planned
future attacks.
At risk of belaboring the obvious, this understanding of imminence turns the
traditional international law interpretation of the concept on its head. Instead
of reading the imminence requirement to mean that states must have concrete
knowledge (or at least reasonable suspicion) of an actual impending attack in
the near future, the United States appears to construe lack of knowledge of a future
attack as the justiﬁcation for using force; that is, since the United States “may not
be aware of all Al Qa’ida plots . . . and thus cannot be conﬁdent that none is about
to occur,” force is presumed always to be justiﬁed against the kinds of people
considered likely to “engage in . . . attacks . . . if [they] were able to do so.”
From a rule-of-law perspective, this is a radical assault on a once-stable concept.
If “imminent threat” can mean “lack of evidence of the absence of imminent
threat,” it is impossible to know, with any clarity, the circumstances under
which the United States will in fact decide that the use of military force is lawful.
The rule-of-law conundrums do not end there. Under international law (cus-
tomary as well as treaty-based), the use of force in self-defense must also be con-
sistent with the principles of necessity and proportionality. The principle of
necessity tracks the “just war” requirement that force should be used only as a
last resort, and when measures short of force have proved ineffective; the principle
of proportionality relates to the amount and nature of the force used. Given the
lack of transparency around U.S. drone strikes, it is impossible to say whether
any given strike (or the totality of strikes) satisﬁes these legal and ethical
principles.
Are all drone strikes “necessary”? Could nonlethal means of combating terror-
ism—such as efforts to disrupt terrorist ﬁnancing and communications—be sufﬁ-
cient to prevent future attacks? Might particular terror suspects be captured rather
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than killed? Do drone strikes inspire more terrorists than they kill? Also, to what
degree does U.S. drone policy distinguish between terrorist threats of varying grav-
ity? If drone strikes against a dozen targets prevented another attack on the scale
of /, few would dispute their appropriateness or legality—but we might judge
differently a drone strike against someone unlikely to cause serious harm to the
United States. Unfortunately, if U.S. decision-makers generally lack speciﬁc
knowledge about the nature and timing of future attacks—which the White
Paper acknowledges—judgments of necessity and proportionality literally become
impossible. How can one decide if lethal force is necessary to prevent a possible
future attack about which one knows nothing? How can proportionality be deter-
mined? Here again, the U.S. legal theory underlying targeted killing makes it
impossible to apply key principles in a meaningful way. Both necessity and pro-
portionality come to be evaluated in the context of purely hypothetical worst-case
scenarios (in theory, any terror suspect might be about to unleash another cata-
strophic attack on the scale of /). As a result, these “limitations” on the use
of force establish no limits at all.
The problem goes still deeper. On an ontological level, it is extraordinarily difﬁ-
cult to know how to categorize U.S. drone strikes and other targeted killings.
Should they be construed as a series of discrete uses of force, each of which
must be independently evaluated for adherence to self-defense principles? Or
do they constitute, in effect, an ongoing use of force made up of many individual
strikes, which should be evaluated collectively? If the latter, can the United States
be said to be in an “armed conﬂict” with militants in Pakistan, suspected al-Qaeda
associates in Yemen, members of the al-Shabaab organization in Somalia, and
assorted other unknown groups and individuals? The Obama administration,
like the Bush administration before it, asserts that the answer is yes. Their position
is that an armed conﬂict can exist between a state and one or more nonstate enti-
ties, even if those nonstate entities are not publicly identiﬁed, their membership
criteria cannot be clearly deﬁned, they lack any hierarchical structure, and their
activities are geographically dispersed.
Outside the United States, most others disagree. In Europe, for instance, as a
recent European Council on Foreign Relations report by Anthony Dworkin
notes, most legal scholars and courts “[reject] the notion of a de-territorialised glo-
bal armed conﬂict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda,” and believe that a “confronta-
tion between a state and a non-state group only rises to the level of an armed
conﬂict if the non-state group meets a threshold for organization . . . there are
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intense hostilities between the two parties . . . [and] ﬁghting [is] concentrated
within a speciﬁc zone (or zones) of hostilities.”
This shifts us from jus ad bellum questions to jus in bello questions. From a
rule-of-law perspective, it is crucial that we be able to determine the existence
(or nonexistence) of an armed conﬂict: if the United States is in an armed conﬂict,
many of the rules relating to the use of force change. In an armed conﬂict, it is
acceptable to target enemy combatants based simply on their status as enemy sol-
diers. If there is no armed conﬂict, such status-based targeting ceases to be accep-
table, and we are thus back to the requirement that force may only be used to ward
off an imminent threat (which, of course, the United States appears to conﬂate
with status).
The international rule of law dilemmas here should be obvious. While the scope
of international law rules relating to self-defense and armed conﬂict have always
been somewhat controversial, the irregular but continuing nature of U.S. drone
strikes adds additional layers of complexity. In a domestic context, such ontologi-
cal disputes would not pose an ongoing challenge to the rule of law: although sig-
niﬁcant legal vagueness and ambiguity might persist for a time, the judiciary
would eventually resolve the uncertainty, by selecting one interpretation over
the others, or new legislation would be passed to resolve the uncertainties. In
the international context, however, there is no referee able to make such vital
calls. There is no judicial system and no “legislature.” States can enter into multi-
lateral treaties, but there is no set procedure for creating such treaties, and in prac-
tice treaties frequently take decades to be negotiated and further decades to enter
into force. Furthermore, the structure of the Security Council makes it near
impossible to imagine a Council-imposed resolution to any of these questions.
Russia and China (and perhaps other Council members as well) would likely
block any U.S. effort to gain Council authorization for drone strikes or create
some international force empowered to engage in such strikes. At the same
time, the seemingly open-ended language of the Council’s post-/ resolutions
cannot be rolled back, since the United States would use its veto to block any
such efforts. For the same reason, U.S. actions cannot be criticized by the Council.
At the moment, the United States itself—as the globe’s only military super-
power—is the sole arbiter of its own actions: with zero transparency, it determines
which laws to apply and it comes up with its own interpretation of core concepts.
Or, to put it in more familiar terms, the United States is judge, jury, and execu-
tioner all rolled into one. It decides how to interpret the law to which it is subject;
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it decides what can be counted as evidence and how to evaluate that evidence; and,
ultimately, it kills.
It is worth noting one last concept that has been increasingly destabilized by
post-/ U.S. legal theories. This is the concept of sovereignty itself, long a
core building block of the Westphalian international legal order. Admittedly,
the absoluteness of sovereignty has always been a legal ﬁction, and in recent dec-
ades globalization has reduced the salience of state borders even as the emergence
of human rights law has chipped away at the state’s normative standing.
Nevertheless, the concept of sovereignty—however frayed and problematic—
remains a bulwark against unpredictable international conﬂict. Recent U.S. pro-
nouncements suggest, however, that this will not remain true for much longer.
U.S. ofﬁcials have repeatedly stated that the United States will only use force on
the territory of other sovereign states if that state either consents or is “unwilling
or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted.” While
this sounds superﬁcially reasonable, the logic is in fact circular, since the
United States is the self-appointed arbiter of whether a state is “unwilling or
unable.”
Thus, if the United States—using its own malleable deﬁnition of “imminent”—
decides that an individual in, say, Pakistan poses a threat to the United States and
requires killing, sovereignty is a nonissue. Either Pakistan will consent to a U.S.
strike inside its territory or it will not consent. And if Pakistan does not con-
sent—on the grounds, perhaps, that it does not agree with the U.S. threat assess-
ment—then Pakistan is, ipso facto, “unwilling or unable to suppress the threat
posed by the individual being targeted.”
This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sover-
eignty, and has the potential to signiﬁcantly destabilize the already shaky collective
security regime created by the UN Charter. After all, if the United States is the
sole judge of whether and when it can use force inside the borders of another state,
any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim similar
prerogatives.
Conclusion
The challenges to the rule of law posed by U.S. drone strikes are numerous, mak-
ing it tempting to assert—as many in the legal and human rights communities
have done—that U.S. drone strikes violate international law. Yet such a conclusion
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would in some ways be as tendentious as U.S. claims of legality. In the inter-
national domain, where there is no authoritative judiciary or legislature capable
of rapidly clarifying the law, legality (or illegality) must still be inferred from
the responses of other states. And so far, although few states have offered explicit
support for U.S. interpretations of international law relating to drone strikes,
equally few have stated expressly that they regard such strikes as unlawful. Most
states have taken a middle path, either expressing somewhat muted concern
about U.S. interpretations of the law or refraining altogether from commenting
on their lawfulness.
It goes without saying that the international legal system is anachronistic from a
human rights perspective, and arguably quite inadequate from a rule-of-law per-
spective. Nevertheless, it is—for now, at least—all we have. U.S. drone strikes thus
present not an issue of law-breaking, but of law’s brokenness. Sustained U.S.
assaults on the meaning of core legal concepts have left international law on
the use of armed force not merely vague or ambiguous but effectively indetermi-
nate, eroding law’s value as a predictor of state conduct and a means of holding
states accountable. If there is no agreement on what constitutes an armed conﬂict,
no agreement on who counts as a combatant, and no agreement on what consti-
tutes an imminent threat, the law is no longer a guidepost.
But although the justiﬁcations for drone strikes proffered by the United States
pose grave challenges to the international rule of law, it would be facile to con-
demn them out of hand. After all, though these strikes (or, more accurately, the
legal theories that underlie them) challenge the international rule of law, they
also represent an effort to respond to gaps and failures in the international system.
It is easy to insist that the United States should not use force without explicit
Security Council authorization, for instance, but the Security Council is paralyzed
by anachronistic membership and voting rules that are themselves arguably incon-
sistent with rule-of-law norms. Similarly, it is easy to point out the absurdity of the
U.S. deﬁnition of “imminent threat,” but the United States is not wholly wrong to
argue that traditional deﬁnitions of imminence are inadequate in the context of
today’s threats. And it is easy to lambast circular U.S. arguments about sover-
eignty, but here again the United States is not necessarily wrong to argue that
when many lives may be at stake, sovereignty surely cannot be an absolute bar
to intervention.
However destabilizing U.S. counterterrorism legal theories are to the rule of law,
they arose in response to real dilemmas, and it is not inconceivable that their very
98 Rosa Brooks
destabilizing qualities could ultimately help usher in a process of much-needed
legal change. Perhaps, for instance, the international community needs to
develop a theory of jus ad vim to occupy the space between war and peace: a
law and ethics relating to ongoing but discrete smaller-scale uses of force, as
Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun have argued. Perhaps we need new inter-
national institutions capable of refereeing such uses of force.
As I noted in the introductory section of this essay, vagueness and ambiguity in
international law sometimes facilitate legal adaptation and evolution. If all or most
states come to accept a new interpretation of key terms and concepts relating to
the use of force, the international law on the use of force will change. If states can-
not agree on how to interpret key concepts, the risk of conﬂict between states will
go up, but the risk of conﬂict can trigger the creation of new dispute-resolution
mechanisms (be they judicial or nonjudicial), which can in turn develop new
authoritative interpretations of the law. As it stands today, most states have
been unwilling either to denounce or to praise the legal theories put forward by
the United States to justify drone strikes. But even such a muted, ambivalent
response may lead to a quiet diplomatic effort to articulate common ground or
to develop compromise or alternative legal frameworks.
It would not do to be Pollyannaish, of course. From a human rights perspective
any changes to the international order sparked by the U.S. war on terror are as
likely to be for the worse than for the better. But it would be just as much a mis-
take to dismiss U.S. counterterrorism policy as the selﬁsh, destructive ﬂailing of an
arrogant, damaged superpower. It is those things, but not only those things. The
United States is struggling to adapt its legal theories and actions to new threats
ushered in by the technological changes of recent decades, and it is not wholly
wrong to take the view that traditional interpretations of the international law
on the use of force have become inadequate. Strong challenges to accepted
interpretations of international law might trigger a new round of international
lawmaking and the creation of new, rule-of-law-enhancing institutions and pro-
cesses. But the international order is a fragile one, and when core norms relating
to the use of force are in disarray, accountability and predictability are undermined.
Ultimately, there is a substantial risk of fragmentation, conﬂict, and collapse.
Hegel famously deﬁned tragedy as the conﬂict between two goods, each overly
rigid in its claims. It is not a bad way to conceptualize the legal debates triggered
by the war on terror—but the end of this drama is not yet written.
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